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Wayfair Undermines Nicastro:
The Constitutional Connection Between State Tax
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction
Allan Erbsen
abstract. This Essay exposes connections between two controversial cases that unsettled
two ostensibly distinct areas of constitutional law. The Supreme Court’s  decision in South
Dakota v. Wayfair held that the Commerce Clause permits enforcement of sales taxes against online
retailers with no physical presence in the taxing state. In contrast, the Court’s  decision in J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro held that the Due Process Clause prevents states from exercising
personal jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers who did not target the forum. Wayfair and
Nicastro address conceptually similar questions about extraterritorial enforcement of state law yet
rely on inconsistent assumptions. A close reading of Wayfair illuminates normative and practical
insights that warrant narrowing or overruling Nicastro. More generally, this Essay highlights how
situating doctrinal problems in the broader context of horizontal federalism can improve
constitutional analysis.
introduction
Justice Kennedy’s nal majority opinion before his retirement is already
reshaping the U.S. economy. South Dakota v. Wayfair held that states may compel
merchants to collect and remit taxes on sales to local buyers even if the seller has
no physical presence in the taxing state.1 States may therefore require online
retailers to collect the same taxes as the brick-and-mortar stores with which they

1.



 S. Ct.  (). The dissent “agree[d]” that prior doctrine was awed for “many of the
reasons given by the Court,” but preferred to respect stare decisis and await a legislative
solution. Id. at  (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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compete. This expansion of regulatory authority will enable states to raise an
additional eight to thirty-three billion dollars of annual tax revenue.2
The holding had swi repercussions. Stock prices gyrated,3 lobbyists
mobilized,4 and Congress considered reactive legislation.5 Meanwhile, states are
rapidly preparing to tap new streams of revenue that the Court’s ruling made
available.6
This immediate economic and political salience has obscured an important
theoretical implication with broad practical consequences. The Court’s decision
links the geographic reach of state power to the nature and magnitude of state
interests. Wayfair highlights states’ “reasonable choices,” their need to avoid
“serious inequity,” and the consequences of an “extraordinary imposition by the
Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public
functions.”7 The Court thus recognized that states may extend their authority
beyond their borders if they have a good reason, subject to ill-dened limits.
Translating the Court’s endorsement of extraterritorial power outside the tax
context could unsettle several strands of horizontal federalism jurisprudence—
the body of law that considers “how the existence of multiple states limits the
power of each.”8 Examples of state action implicating horizontal federalism fall
into eight categories that I have dened elsewhere, including,

2.
3.

4.

See id. at  (majority opinion) (noting varying estimates of increased state tax revenue).
See Brian Deagon, E-Commerce Stocks Smacked by Supreme Court Ruling on State Taxes, INV.
BUS. DAILY (June , ), https://www.investors.com/research/ibd-industry-themes/
supreme-court-ruling-ecommerce-stocks [https://perma.cc/ESU-QRK].
See, e.g., Hamilton Davison, Supreme Court Sales Tax Ruling Is Clear; Ramications of It Could
Not Be Less Clear, HILL (June , , : AM EDT), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress
-blog/economy-budget/-supreme-court-sales-tax-ruling-is-clear-ramications-of
[https://perma.cc/DNM-PSK] (expressing views of the President of the American Catalog
Mailers Association). For a discussion of the “practice opportunities” that Wayfair creates for
lobbyists and lawyers, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Judicial Activism and the Commerce Clause,
 ST. TAX NOTES , -.

5.

See, e.g., Stop Taxing Our Potential Act of , S. , th Cong.; Online Sales Simplicity
and Small Business Relief Act of , H.R. , th Cong.; see also Brian Galle, Kill Quill,
Keep the Dormant Commerce Clause: History’s Lessons on Congressional Control of State Taxation,
 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE  () (discussing potential legislative reforms).

6.

7.

See Joseph Bishop-Henchman et al., Post-Wayfair Options for States, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N &
INCENTIVES, Nov./Dec. , at , - (summarizing state initiatives). States must
cautiously consider a “checklist” of factors that Wayfair implied were important. Id. at ; see
also Wayfair,  S. Ct. at  (emphasizing that South Dakota’s statute provided
“protection” for “small merchants”).
Wayfair,  S. Ct. at , .

8.

Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism,  MINN. L. REV. ,  ().
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attempts to exercise dominion over other states’ ocers or territory,
creation of havens for conduct that other states would prefer to ban or
limit, exclusion of activities that other states promote, favoritism for instate actors at the expense of out-of-state actors, allowing in-state activity
to generate negative out-of-state externalities, aggressive rogue behavior
that fails to respect the interests of other states, mutually debilitating
interstate competition, and overreaching of state borders through
extraterritorial regulation.9
This Essay addresses the last example of state action noted above: reaching
beyond state borders to assert authority over nonresidents whose conduct has
eects in the forum. Extraterritorial regulation is inevitable in a federal system
that fragments a national market into political units. State borders cannot
contain the eects of local laws or exclude the eects of out-of-state conduct any
more than lane markers in a swimming pool can contain or exclude waves. A
rigid xation on territorial borders is therefore an unhelpful approach to
complex problems about the scope of state authority. Instead, courts must
analyze nuanced factors and recognize that problems arising in ostensibly
distinct elds share common features that may warrant similar solutions. This
Essay considers Wayfair’s potentially broad implications for horizontal
federalism jurisprudence by comparing doctrines governing the states’ tax
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
The concept of “tax jurisdiction” can be confusing, but for present purposes
a simple framework suces. Analyzing tax jurisdiction requires asking two
distinct questions: () can states tax a particular transaction; and () how can
states enforce the tax?10 When out-of-state merchants sell products to local
buyers, states can tax the transactions based on their local nexus.11 The dicult
issue is whether states can enforce taxes eectively. In routine transactions, the
burden of enforcement falls on either the buyer or the seller. States can require
local buyers to disclose purchases and remit tax payments to the state, or states
can compel out-of-state sellers to collect and remit taxes as part of the sales
process. Relying on sellers is far more eective than relying on buyers, who oen

9.

Id. at -.

10.

For a discussion of this bifurcation, see Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective,  GA. L. REV. , 
() (noting that “substantive jurisdiction to tax and enforcement jurisdiction” are not “airtight categories”).
See Wayfair,  S. Ct. at  (“All concede that taxing the sales in question here is lawful.”).

11.
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neither know nor care about their compliance obligations.12 Before Wayfair, the
Court had interpreted the Commerce Clause to foreclose imposing burdens on
sellers who lacked a “physical presence” in the taxing state.13 Wayfair removed
this impediment to eective tax enforcement, raising a question about whether
the Court should reconsider other judicially imposed obstacles to eective
extraterritorial enforcement of valid state laws.
Justice Kennedy’s exaltation of state interests in Wayfair is strikingly
inconsistent with his  plurality opinion rejecting personal jurisdiction in J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.14 The Nicastro plurality held that New Jersey
lacked jurisdiction over the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product that
maimed a local worker despite the state’s “strong” regulatory interest.15 Scholars
have extensively criticized Nicastro, describing the plurality opinion as
“territoriality on steroids”16 and a “retrogressive” boon for manufacturers at the
expense of consumers.17 Lower courts hoping for guidance from the fractured
decision have instead encountered “a bit of mystery.”18 A close reading of Wayfair
and Nicastro reveals several inconsistencies that call for reconsidering the Court’s
approach to personal jurisdiction. For example, the decisions rely on conicting
approaches to the relevance of state interests, fairness, market dynamics, and
outlier fact patterns.
This Essay explores connections between Wayfair and Nicastro and makes
two contributions. Part I illuminates overlooked parallels between the evolution
of constitutional limits on state tax authority and personal jurisdiction. Part II
explains why Wayfair warrants rethinking the Court’s excessively restrictive
approach to personal jurisdiction.

12.

See Hayes R. Holderness, Questioning Quill,  VA. TAX REV. , - & n. (). Taxes
remitted by buyers are typically called use taxes, while taxes remitted by sellers are typically
called sales taxes. Although use taxes and sales taxes are “functionally equivalent,”  JEROME
R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ .[] (d ed. ), the Court has fostered
uncertainty about whether formal dierences aect the application of constitutional
standards. See Adam Thimmesch et al., Wayfair: Sales Tax Formalism and Income Tax Nexus,
 ST. TAX NOTES , -. I refer to use taxes and sales taxes interchangeably without
expressing a view about whether subtle dierences might matter in some circumstances.
13. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,  U.S. ,  ().
14.  U.S.  ().
15.

Id. at  (plurality opinion).
Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism,  STAN. L. REV. ,  () (characterizing
Nicastro as “fetishizing the concept of a purposeful contact”).
17. Arthur R. Miller, Simplied Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure,  N.Y.U. L. REV. ,  ().
18.  CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § . & nn.- (th
ed. ) (citing cases).
16.
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i. parallel evolution of constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction and state tax authority
A. Conceptual Similarities
A state’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents is
ostensibly distinct from its power to compel nonresidents to collect and remit
sales taxes. These powers address dierent problems, promote dierent
interests, entail dierent remedies, and implicate dierent constitutional
provisions. The legal academy reinforces these distinctions by addressing
personal jurisdiction and tax law in separate courses and separate elds of
scholarship.
Formal dierences between state authority to enforce taxes and to exercise
personal jurisdiction obscure conceptual similarities. Consider a simple
hypothetical scenario that illustrates the overlap. A seller (S) in State X sells a
product to a buyer (B) in State Y without ever physically entering State Y. The
legislature of State Y believes that transactions of this type implicate legitimate
regulatory interests and therefore has enacted a statute containing two sections.
Section  compels S to collect and remit sales taxes. Section  compels S to appear
in State Y’s courts in any civil suit by B arising from the sale.
Both statutory obligations raise at least three similar questions. First, there
is a question about State Y’s capacity to act: does economic activity in State Y
justify allowing State Y to compel conduct by an actor outside its borders?
Second, there is a question about S’s rights: is S immune from State Y’s power if
S never physically enters State Y? And third, there is a question about dormant
federal preemption: can State Y regulate a commercial actor in State X without
congressional authorization?
All three questions are dicult for the same reason: the Constitution
empowers y coequal states without providing clear guidance for addressing
overlapping jurisdiction. This ambiguity engenders myriad disputes. States
challenge interference from other states, individuals resist state authority, and
Congress claims power to intervene that states in turn contest. I have argued
elsewhere that these disputes implicate a constellation of doctrines regulating
horizontal federalism.19 Unfortunately, the Court and commentators typically
view each problem in isolation, which obscures inconsistent assumptions,
priorities, and methods.20 Doctrine governing personal jurisdiction and state tax
authority illustrates both the allure of fragmenting related problems into discrete
components and the incoherence that fragmentation can produce.
19.

See Erbsen, supra note , at -.

20.

See id. at , -.
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At rst glance, questions about the scope of state authority seem to require
dierent answers in the jurisdiction and tax contexts. For example,






B’s interest in a convenient local forum may justify State Y’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction over S, but there is no
corresponding individual interest justifying State Y’s assertion of
tax authority;
A legal ction that S consented to State Y’s authority may more
(or less) readily justify tax enforcement than personal
jurisdiction;
Collecting and remitting a tax may be more (or less)
burdensome than appearing in a distant court; and
Federal preemption may be more (or less) appropriate when a
state enlists interstate merchants as tax collectors than when the
state compels merchants to appear in civil litigation.

These potential distinctions weigh against a simplistic rule making a state’s
authority to enforce sales taxes coextensive with its adjudicative jurisdiction.
However, considering the two contexts concurrently highlights relevant facts
and facilitates a more nuanced analysis of state power, individual rights, and
federal preemption. This nuance is missing from current case law, resulting in
inconsistent applications of similar principles across multiple doctrines.
Wayfair’s inconsistency with Nicastro is the latest evidence of this longstanding
pathology in horizontal federalism jurisprudence.
B. Doctrinal Evolution
Conceptual similarities between personal jurisdiction and extraterritorial tax
authority are evident in the Supreme Court’s decisions. Doctrine governing each
area evolved independently yet followed parallel paths. This parallelism
underscores the theoretical connections between Wayfair and Nicastro that make
the rhetorical and substantive inconsistencies between the decisions so striking.
The historical sketch in this Section is brief and necessarily simplied. My
goal is not to provide a denitive account of two complex areas of law. Instead, I
highlight a few oen overlooked historical and thematic connections that
conrm the importance of analyzing personal jurisdiction and state tax authority
as two related strands of horizontal federalism jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court initially imposed strict territorial limits on both personal
jurisdiction and tax authority. Consider two opinions by Justice Field that use
similar language. In re State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds held in  that the state
in which a bond issuer was incorporated could not tax interest on bonds owned



the yale law journal forum

February , 

by nonresidents.21 Justice Field’s opinion observed that state “tax laws . . . can
have no extra-territorial operation”22 because
property lying beyond the jurisdiction of the State is not a subject upon
which her taxing power can be legitimately exercised . . . . The power of
taxation, however vast in its character and searching in its extent, is
necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the State . . . . So
far as they are held by non-residents of the State, they are property
beyond the jurisdiction of the State.23
One year later, in Galpin v. Page, Justice Field reiterated (without citing) this
territorial approach when he dened the scope of a state’s personal jurisdiction:
The tribunals of one State have no jurisdiction over the persons of other
States unless found within their territorial limits; they cannot extend
their process into other States, and any attempt of the kind would be
treated in every other forum as an act of usurpation without any binding
ecacy.24
Territorial limits on state adjudicative and tax jurisdiction eventually became
constitutionally enshrined in the Due Process Clause.25 The Supreme Court’s
decisions in both contexts stressed that the presence of property within a state
could not authorize state action against an owner located outside the state.26
Over time, domicile-based exceptions to territorial limits emerged in both
contexts. States could: () exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

21.

 U.S. ( Wall.) ,  ().
Id. at -.
23. Id. at -. This language was dictum because the corporation’s treasurer collected the tax
within the state by deducting it from payments to nonresidents. The Court therefore rested
its holding on the Contracts Clause. See id. at  (holding that the state could not interfere
with contractually required interest payments).
24.  U.S. ( Wall.) ,  ().
22.

25.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § .
26. See Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright,  U.S. ,  () (“A state may not tax property
belonging to a foreign corporation which has never come within its borders—to do so under
any formula would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Pennoyer
v. Ne,  U.S. , - () (holding that a nonresident defendant’s ownership of
property in the forum is not a sucient basis for personal jurisdiction); id. at  (citing the
Due Process Clause).
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domiciliary,27 and () tax a domiciliary’s intangible property deemed to have a
“real situs” at the domicile.28 States could also tax nonresidents’ tangible
property within their territory.29 But the Court cited personal jurisdiction
precedent to hold that a state’s remedies were limited to the property; the state
could sell the property to cover an unpaid tax, but could not levy an assessment
against the nonresident owner.30
Just as two opinions by Justice Field illustrate the parallel rise of the
territorial approach, two opinions by Chief Justice Stone illustrate its parallel
decline. In the famous case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court held
that Washington could exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
operating within its borders.31 In the relatively obscure case of Curry v.
McCanless, the Court held that Alabama and Tennessee could tax the same
intangible property based on the property’s distinct connections to each state.32
Both cases presented an opportunity for the Court to frame the due process
inquiry in terms of an ethereal “presence” within a state’s territory.33 The
corporation in Shoe could have been deemed to be present in Washington
(among other states), while the property in Curry could have been deemed to be
present either in Alabama, Tennessee, or both. Yet Chief Justice Stone in Shoe
and Curry rejected the Court’s prior xation with situating incorporeal legal
concepts in physical space. Both opinions: () eschew unrealistic “ctions” about

27.

28.

29.
30.

31.
32.

33.

See Milliken v. Meyer,  U.S. ,  () (“Domicile in the state is alone sucient to
bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for the purposes of a
personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.”).
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,  U.S. ,  (). The Court justied the
domicile state’s taxation of intangible property in part because of territorial limits on personal
jurisdiction that would have prevented other states from collecting the tax. See id.
See Dewey v. Des Moines,  U.S. , - ().
See id. (citing Pennoyer). The Court recently granted certiorari in a case that may revisit due
process constraints on state authority when a nonresident holds property for the benet of a
resident. See Kimberley Rice Kaestner  Family Trust v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue,  S.E.d
,  (N.C. ) (holding that the Due Process Clause barred North Carolina from taxing
the undistributed income of an out-of-state trust even though the trust’s beneciaries resided
in North Carolina), cert. granted,  U.S.L.W.  (U.S. Jan. , ) (No. -).
 U.S.  ().
 U.S.  (). In Curry, a grantor in Tennessee transferred stocks and bonds to a trustee
in Alabama. Id. at . When the grantor died in Tennessee, her will distributed the trust
assets. Id. at . Both states claimed authority to tax the distributed property based on
connections to either the decedent or the trust. Id. Although stocks and bonds are physical
documents, the Court characterized them as “paper evidences” of “intangibles.” Id.
Curry,  U.S. at ; Shoe,  U.S. at .
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presence,34 () reject “mechanical” tests of due process,35 () justify state power
in part because regulated entities received the “benet” and “protection” of state
law,36 and () emphasize that the state’s regulatory interests provide a
foundation for asserting authority.37
Subsequent decisions—most notably Quill Corp. v. North Dakota38—claried
that the due process inquiry in personal jurisdiction and state tax authority cases
converged, at least at an abstract level. In both contexts, Quill held that due
process required “minimum contacts” between the state and an entity subject to
its authority.39 The Court’s decisions in tax cases occasionally cited personal
jurisdiction cases,40 and vice versa.41
The vague “minimum contacts” test oered minimum guidance to judges.
Eorts to implement it can be described charitably as multifaceted and more
accurately as muddled. But some parallel themes emerged in personal
jurisdiction and state tax authority cases.42 Analyzing contacts oen required
examining the “nature and extent” of the regulated party’s local activities,43 the
correlation between “protection” that a state provided and obligations it

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

41.

42.

43.



Curry,  U.S. at ; Shoe,  U.S. at .
Curry,  U.S. at ; Shoe,  U.S. at .
Curry,  U.S. at ; Shoe,  U.S. at .
Curry,  U.S. at ; Shoe,  U.S. at .
 U.S.  ().
Id. at . In the tax context, due process required minimum contacts with both the taxpayer
and the taxable activity. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,  U.S. , 
().
See Quill,  U.S. at - (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,  U.S.  ();
Shaer v. Heitner,  U.S.  (); and Shoe,  U.S. ); Nw. States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota,  U.S. ,  () (citing Shoe); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 
U.S. ,  () (citing Shoe).
See Estin v. Estin,  U.S. ,  () (citing Curry); Shoe,  U.S. at - (citing
several tax cases); cf. Hanson v. Denckla,  U.S. ,  () (citing Curry while analyzing
in rem jurisdiction).
Of course, some questions are unique to each context. See, e.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State
Tax Comm’n,  U.S.  () (considering due process constraints on the apportionment
of taxable income between states); Kulko v. Superior Court,  U.S. ,  ()
(considering the burden imposed on a defendant summoned to an inconvenient forum);
supra text accompanying notes -.
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,  U.S. ,  () (tax jurisdiction); accord Shoe,  U.S. at 
(analyzing the “quality and nature” of contacts relevant to personal jurisdiction).
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imposed,44 and the state’s regulatory interest.45 Personal jurisdiction cases also
emphasized that an actor’s contacts with the forum state must be “purposeful.”46
Tax cases generally did not emphasize purpose, presumably because purpose was
obvious when the regulated actor knew where transactional counterparties were
located.47 In contrast, when an out-of-state merchant did not know or control a
product’s destination, the Court rejected both state tax authority48 and personal
jurisdiction.49
Although constitutional limits on personal and tax jurisdiction evolved in
parallel, an important twist involving the Commerce Clause complicates analysis
of the sales taxes upheld in Wayfair. Until , the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses anachronistically
prohibited states from enforcing sales and use taxes against merchants who
lacked sucient “presence” in the taxing state.50 In , the Court partially
changed course in Quill, which considered whether North Dakota could require
a vendor to collect use taxes arising from sales of oce supplies to customers in
the state.51 The vendor argued that it was beyond the reach of North Dakota’s
authority because it lacked a local presence and instead transacted business by
mail and telephone.52 The Court held that the Due Process Clause did not
44.

51.

Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co.,  U.S. ,  () (tax jurisdiction); accord Hanson, 
U.S. at  (personal jurisdiction).
See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins.,  U.S. ,  () (acknowledging the state’s “manifest
interest” in exercising personal jurisdiction); Miller Bros. v. Maryland,  U.S. , 
() (noting potential justications for “experimental” tax innovations).
Hanson,  U.S. at .
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,  U.S. ,  () (devoting only two paragraphs of
analysis to the apparently simple question of whether a merchant who sold to local buyers
“purposefully directed its activities” toward the taxing state).
See Miller Bros.,  U.S. at .
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,  U.S. ,  (). Both Nicastro and
Volkswagen involved defendants who did not send their products directly into the forum. See
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,  U.S. ,  () (plurality opinion) (noting that
the defendant manufacturer sold through a distributor); Volkswagen,  U.S. at  (noting
that the consumer purchased a car from a defendant in New York and drove it to Oklahoma).
But Nicastro’s rejection of jurisdiction expanded on Volkswagen’s holding by rejecting
intentional targeting of the entire U.S. market as a basis for jurisdiction in a state within that
market when the defendant sold through an intermediary. See infra text accompanying notes
- (discussing Nicastro). In contrast, the Volkswagen defendants were engaged in regional
activity far from Oklahoma and made no eort to “serve the Oklahoma market.” Volkswagen,
 U.S. at .
Quill,  U.S. at -, .
Id. at .

52.

See id. at .

45.

46.
47.

48.
49.

50.
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condition state tax authority on a merchant’s physical presence.53 However, this
due process holding had little practical eect because Quill also held that the
presence requirement remained in the Commerce Clause.54 So North Dakota
won the due process battle but still lost the case.
Quill’s preservation of the presence test under the Commerce Clause was a
stubbornly persistent relic of territorial reasoning. Even the Court acknowledged
that the test was “articial” and at best “not inconsistent” with modern doctrine
governing state regulatory authority.55 The Court hoped that Congress would
provide a more nuanced solution.56 But Congress remained silent for the next
twenty-six years. Wayfair then abandoned the Court’s unrequited preference for
legislative action. Instead, Wayfair extended Quill’s due process holding to the
Commerce Clause.57 Both clauses now permit states to enforce sales taxes
against merchants with no physical presence in the forum.58
Although Wayfair exclusively addressed the Commerce Clause, its analysis is
still relevant to Nicastro, which exclusively addressed the Due Process Clause.59
First, both clauses are part of an overlapping web of constitutional provisions
governing horizontal federalism that are best understood together rather than in
isolation.60 Despite imposing dierent tests for dierent reasons, the two clauses

53.
54.

55.
56.

57.

Id. at .
See id. at . The Court subsequently declined to decide whether holding intangible property
in a state is a sucient local presence to justify the state’s taxation of income from that
property. See Georey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n,  S.E.d ,  (S.C. ), cert. denied, 
U.S.  ().
Quill,  U.S. at , .
See id. at  (“[T]he underlying issue is not only one that Congress may be better qualied
to resolve, but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve . . . . Congress is now
free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order
concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.” (footnote omitted)).
See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,  S. Ct. , - ().

58.

Wayfair le open the possibility that “some other principle” could limit state authority and
that merchants with very low sales volumes could be immune from tax obligations. Id. at
.
59. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,  U.S. , ,  () (plurality opinion).
60.



See Erbsen, supra note . Thus, although the Court oen observes that dierent issues animate
constitutional limits on legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction, see, e.g., Nicastro,  U.S. at
- (plurality opinion), that observation invites questions about the magnitude and
materiality of any dierences, see Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction Based on the Local Eects of
Intentional Misconduct,  WM. & MARY L. REV. , - () (considering potential
intersections between doctrines governing extraterritorial legislation and personal
jurisdiction).
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are “closely related”61 and generate “parallel”62 inquiries.63 Even beyond the tax
context, personal jurisdiction doctrine occasionally implicates the Commerce
Clause.64 Second, doctrines interpreting both clauses share a similar history.
Supreme Court decisions from the s and s denied “jurisdiction” over
defendants due to the “necessities of commerce.”65 These cases relied on the
Commerce Clause to serve a function that the Court later allocated to the Due
Process Clause. Meanwhile, the Commerce Clause’s role as a constraint on state
tax authority evolved in parallel with Due Process Clause jurisprudence, but the
Court’s decisions before Quill oen failed to distinguish between the two
clauses.66 And as noted above, Chief Justice Stone helped nudge both Due
Process Clause and Commerce Clause jurisprudence away from stilted formal
tests and toward practical consideration of competing interests.67 Third, Wayfair
61.
62.
63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,  U.S. , 756 (1967).
MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue,  U.S. ,  ().
Quill’s holding that the Commerce Clause foreclosed taxes that satised due process stressed
dierences between the two inquiries, especially that “while Congress has plenary power to
regulate commerce among the States and thus may authorize state actions that burden
interstate commerce . . . it does not similarly have the power to authorize violations of the Due
Process Clause.” Quill,  U.S. at . Quill understated Congress’s power to authorize
personal jurisdiction. See Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction,  EMORY L.J. , - ()
(contending that the Constitution empowers Congress to address the optimal scope of the
states’ personal jurisdiction).
See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter.,  U.S. ,  () (observing that a
state statute requiring a corporation to consent to general jurisdiction as a condition of doing
business in the state may impose “an unreasonable burden on commerce”).
Int’l Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co.,  U.S. ,  (); see also Davis v. Farmers’
Coop. Equity Co.,  U.S. ,  () (“[O]rderly, eective administration of justice
clearly does not require that a foreign carrier shall submit to a suit in a State in which the cause
of action did not arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in
which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plainti does not
reside.”); Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Terte,  U.S. ,  () (following Davis);
Mich. Cent. R.R. v. Mix,  U.S. , - () (same); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. v. Wells,  U.S. ,  () (same). Chief Justice Stone recharacterized these cases
as addressing “venue” rather than jurisdiction. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,  U.S.
,  ().
See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective,  WM.
& MARY L. REV. ,  () (“Until [Quill], the Court had not indicated that the Due
Process and Commerce Clause nexus standards diverged in any meaningful way.”).
See supra notes -; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,  U.S. ,  () (“Whether due
process is satised must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process
clause to insure.”). Compare Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,  U.S. ,  () (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting a “mechanical” Commerce Clause jurisprudence of “labels” in favor of
considering “all the facts and circumstances”), with Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 
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and Nicastro both relied heavily on abstract contentions about state power rather
than technical inquiries into obscure elements of doctrine. Inconsistencies
between Justice Kennedy’s analysis in the two cases therefore raise questions
about Nicastro’s continuing vitality. Just as the due process holding in Quill
precipitated the Commerce Clause holding in Wayfair, Wayfair’s Commerce
Clause holding should precipitate reconsideration of Nicastro’s due process
holding.
ii. the tension between justice kennedy’s opinions in
nicastro and wayfair
In Nicastro, the defendant manufactured machines that sheared scrap metal.
The manufacturer hoped to sell its machines throughout the United States and
assisted in marketing them.68 A scrap-metal recycler in New Jersey installed one
of the manufacturer’s machines, which severed four of an employee’s ngers.69
The injured worker led a product liability action in New Jersey.
If the manufacturer had sold directly to the buyer, the Court probably would
have upheld jurisdiction.70 However, the manufacturer instead marketed
through a distributor in Ohio, which in turn sold to the buyer before eventually
becoming insolvent (and thus judgment-proof).71 The record did not clearly
indicate any other direct contacts with New Jersey.72 Because sales were through
an intermediary, the manufacturer successfully argued that its contacts with New
Jersey were not purposeful. The Court therefore rejected New Jersey’s attempt
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Nicastro involves a chain of ve linked
propositions. The points ow roughly as follows:

68.
69.
70.

71.
72.



U.S. ,  () (citing Justice Stone’s dissent in Di Santo and holding that Commerce
Clause analysis “involves a sensitive consideration” of several factors).
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,  U.S. , - () (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at .
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,  U.S. , - () (endorsing in
dicta personal jurisdiction based on direct sales of “defective merchandise” to the forum);
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co.,  U.S. ,  () (upholding jurisdiction based on a single
intentional transaction, coupled with ancillary interactions, in the forum state).
See Nicastro,  U.S. at  n. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
However, jurisdictional discovery may have been inadequate. See Miller, supra note , at 
(observing that “the record was decient on certain possibly critical matters that might have
aected the view of one or more of the Justices”).

wayfair undermines nicastro

) Constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction ensure that states
exercise only “lawful” power.73
) State power is lawful with respect to outsiders only when the
outsider has “purposefully” sought to benet from or obstruct state
law, regardless of whether the state has an “interest” in providing a
forum.74
) When jurisdiction is premised on selling a defective product that
reaches a buyer in the forum, contacts are purposeful only when the
forum has been “targeted.”75
) Evidence of targeting can be found only in the defendant’s “actions”
rather than in its “expectations.”76
) The manufacturer’s only relevant action was selling to the
distributor in Ohio. Thus, there was no action targeting New Jersey
and no basis for jurisdiction.77
This reasoning is tenuous. The manufacturer’s targeting of the entire U.S.
market also targeted New Jersey, which is a component of the national market.
Moreover, the concept of targeting is a red herring. As I have argued elsewhere,
a lack of targeting should not be dispositive when the defendant benets from
conduct that causes harm in the forum.78
But even if Nicastro was defensible at the time it was decided, Wayfair
undermines the plurality’s analysis for ve reasons.
First, Wayfair and Nicastro give inconsistent weight to state interests. In
Wayfair, the Court sought to avoid an “extraordinary imposition” on states that
would enable market participants to “escape” reasonable regulations.79 But
Nicastro facilitated such an escape because the plurality contended that
protecting state interests would elevate “expediency” over “liberty.”80 The two
decisions do not provide any guidance for distinguishing legitimate state
priorities from expedient shortcuts. One might think that these discordant
approaches to state interests arise from distinctions between the Commerce
Clause inquiry in tax cases and the Due Process Clause inquiry in personal
73.

Nicastro,  U.S. at  (plurality opinion).
Id. at -.
75. Id. at .
74.

76.

Id. at .
77. Id. at .
78.
79.

See Erbsen, supra note , at -.
South Dakota v. Wayfair,  S. Ct. ,  ().

80.

Nicastro,  U.S. at  (plurality opinion).
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jurisdiction cases. However, as Wayfair notes, the two inquiries are “closely
related,”81 and the Court’s analysis of personal jurisdiction before Nicastro oen
prioritized state interests.82 Accordingly, if South Dakota’s interests justied
taxation of nonresident merchants, then New Jersey’s interests could have
justied jurisdiction over nonresident manufacturers and should not have been
so casually dismissed.
The possibility that Wayfair aects only merchants who engage in a larger
volume of local business than the manufacturer in Nicastro cannot support the
Court’s inconsistent approach to state interests.83 The record is not clear, but
arguably the volume of local sales in Nicastro was almost identical to the
minimum threshold that the Court upheld in Wayfair.84 Even if Wayfair requires
a greater volume of local sales than occurred in Nicastro, sales volumes are
irrelevant when considering whether states have an interest in regulating
particular transactions, as opposed to considering whether regulations impose
excessive burdens. Analyzing a state’s assertion of power over nonresidents
requires considering two sides of an equation: the state’s reason for acting and
the consequences of its action. A regulatory interest may be a good reason to
impose tax obligations and to exercise personal jurisdiction even when the
volume of local business is small.85 But exercising power over an entity based on
81.
82.

83.

84.

85.



Wayfair,  S. Ct. at .
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,  U.S. ,  () (recognizing that the forum
state had “a signicant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State”);
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co.,  U.S. ,  () (noting that the forum state had “a
manifest interest in providing eective means of redress for its residents”); Travelers Health
Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n,  U.S. ,  () (“The Due Process
Clause does not forbid a state to protect its citizens from . . . injustice.”).
Compare Wayfair,  S. Ct. at  (noting that the defendants “easily” exceeded the statutory
threshold for taxation, which required that merchants “deliver more than $, of goods
or services into the State or engage in  or more separate transactions for the delivery of
goods or services into the State”), with Nicastro,  U.S. at  (plurality opinion) (stressing
limited local sales).
The machine at issue in Nicastro cost $,. See Nicastro,  U.S. at  (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). If four machines reached the forum, as the plurality recognized was possible, see
id. at  (plurality opinion), then aggregate sales revenue would have been $,
(assuming all four machines were similar). South Dakota’s sales threshold for imposing tax
obligations is $,. See Wayfair,  S. Ct. at .
See Wayfair,  S. Ct. at  (noting that a state can enforce its tax laws against an entity
with “one salesperson” based in the forum); McGee,  U.S. at  (upholding personal
jurisdiction based on a single direct sale to the forum); cf. Nicastro,  U.S. at  (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that a single indirect sale might not be sucient to
establish personal jurisdiction); Gordon v. Holder,  F.d ,  (D.C. Cir. ) (noting,
in an opinion written before Wayfair, that whether a single direct sale through the internet
creates “minimum contacts” raises a “dicult constitutional question”).

wayfair undermines nicastro

a small volume of business can cause disproportionate consequences—such as
compliance burdens—that outweigh state interests. A court cannot know
whether burdens outweigh state interests until it assesses whether the state
interests are important. This is where the Court went astray in Nicastro. By
dismissing state interests as mere “expediency,” the Court never engaged in a
nuanced balancing analysis. Burdens on the manufacturer easily tipped the scales
because there was no meaningful counterweight. Now that Wayfair has
recognized the importance of acknowledging state interests, the balancing in
Nicastro is amenable to reconsideration.
Second, Wayfair recognized that allowing extraterritorial tax enforcement
might impose “burdens” that raise “legitimate concerns in some instances,
particularly for small businesses” with a “small volume” of local sales.86 These
concerns were not a basis for rejecting state power because “other theories” and
“other aspects” of doctrine were available to protect deserving claimants.87
Wayfair thus endorsed broad state power while reserving questions about outlier
cases. Nicastro took the opposite approach, in eect allowing the tail to wag the
dog. The Court invoked fears about burdening low-volume small businesses—
such as a Florida farmer sued in Alaska88 or an “Appalachian potter” sued in
Hawaii89—to deny jurisdiction over all businesses that did not directly target the
forum. A more sensible solution would have been to recognize state power while
deploying other doctrines—such as potential constitutional limits on venue—to
protect outlier defendants.90
Third, Wayfair criticized “[d]istortions” arising from Quill’s “incentive” for
merchants “to avoid physical presence in multiple States” by operating only
through the internet or mail.91 In other words, doctrine should not encourage
market participants to structure their conduct in an inecient manner simply to
evade local regulation. Yet Nicastro achieves the opposite result. Its emphasis on
targeting the forum incentivizes manufacturers to use intermediaries as a means
of insulating themselves from jurisdiction.
Fourth, Wayfair stressed the importance of “[f]airness,” observing that
corporations that “avail themselves of the States’ benets” should bear
correlative burdens.92 In contrast, the Nicastro plurality condemned “[f]reeform
86.

Wayfair,  S. Ct. at .
87. Id. at -.
88.

See Nicastro,  U.S. at  (plurality opinion).
89. Id. at - (Breyer, J., concurring).
90.
91.

See Erbsen, supra note , at -.
Wayfair,  S. Ct. at .

92.

Id. at .
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notions of fundamental fairness.”93 The manufacturer therefore was immune
from burdens imposed by New Jersey. From a “benets” perspective, both the
seller in Wayfair and the manufacturer in Nicastro were similarly situated: both
beneted from state laws creating a stable market for their products. If collecting
a sales tax is a reasonable price to pay for access to the market, submitting to
adjudicative jurisdiction might also be reasonable. However, one potentially
meaningful distinction between the two contexts is that Wayfair involved
benets from a direct sale while Nicastro involved benets from a sale through
an intermediary. The next point addresses that distinction.
Finally, Wayfair noted that doctrine must be “grounded in functional,
marketplace dynamics” that respect state eorts to address economic “realities.”94
This principle helped explain why states regulating a modern economy may tax
sales through the internet in the same way as sales through competing physical
outlets. Extending Wayfair’s functional approach to personal jurisdiction
undermines Nicastro’s emphasis on directly targeting the forum. In the real
world, manufacturers of industrial machinery do not necessarily target
individual states. They target the entire country. Indeed, the manufacturer in
Nicastro attended national rather than state-specic sales conventions and told
its distributor “[a]ll we wish to do is sell our products in the [United] States—
and get paid!”95 States seeking to hold manufacturers accountable for injuries
caused by defective products therefore must be able to reach defendants who did
not focus on that individual state’s market. If one takes Wayfair’s functional
approach seriously, then Nicastro’s emphasis on direct sales and state-specic
targeting seems needlessly myopic.
Of course, Wayfair does not formally hold that targeting an individual state
is irrelevant because the merchants in Wayfair presumably did target South
Dakota.96 However, that targeting does not animate the Court’s holding. To see
why, suppose that the Delaware-based Acme Corporation creates a website that
sells widgets. Acme conducts no marketing beyond buying a single national
television advertisement during the Super Bowl. The advertisement generates a
million sales, including ten thousand sales to residents of South Dakota.
Wayfair’s reasoning leads inexorably to the conclusion that South Dakota can
require Acme to collect sales taxes even though Acme’s marketing did not
specically target the state. Yet Nicastro seems to draw a line between entities
that target the forum and entities that target the national market. Wayfair’s

93.

Nicastro,  U.S. at  (plurality opinion).
94. Wayfair,  S. Ct. at .
95.
96.



Nicastro,  U.S. at  (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See Wayfair,  S. Ct. at  (noting that online merchants benet from “targeted
advertising and instant access to most consumers via any internet-enabled device”).

wayfair undermines nicastro

emphasis on the “functional” “realities” of how merchants generate sales is
inconsistent with Nicastro’s assumption that only state-specic rather than
national marketing justies state authority over manufacturers who sell through
intermediaries.
In sum, Wayfair and Nicastro take incongruent approaches to conceptually
similar problems. Wayfair extolls state interests, tries to cra rules that recognize
how markets work and avoid distorting behavior, promotes fairness, and does
not allow outlier scenarios to drive analysis. Nicastro impugns state interests,
ignores how markets actually work while incentivizing inecient behavior,
rejects fairness, and emphasizes outlier hypotheticals. The sensible analysis in
Wayfair should eclipse the thinly reasoned decision in Nicastro.97
Wayfair poses an especially compelling challenge to Nicastro because Nicastro
is an unstable precedent that is unusually amenable to being overruled or
narrowed into obscurity. First, although six Justices concurred in Nicastro’s
judgment, there was no majority opinion. Justice Kennedy wrote a plurality
opinion joined by only three other Justices (Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas). Half
the plurality is no longer on the Court, raising a question about whether the
opinion’s analysis would survive reexamination. Second, the two concurring
Justices (Breyer and Alito) expressly noted their willingness to consider “a
change in present law” in a future case with a more developed record.98 Third,
the concurrence can be interpreted as agreeing with the dissent’s view of
applicable law and supporting the plurality only due to ambiguities in the
record.99 Under that interpretation, Nicastro’s holding has minimal precedential
force and should be read narrowly.100 Fourth, the Court has conspicuously
declined to cite Nicastro in its subsequent decisions addressing personal

97.

For further analysis of why the Court’s current personal jurisdiction doctrine is awed, see
Erbsen, supra note .
98. See Nicastro,  U.S. at  (Breyer, J., concurring).
99.

See Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,  S.C. L. REV. ,  () (observing that the concurrence
and the dissent disagreed about whether the manufacturer in fact knew that “potential
customers were likely to exist in the forum state”).
100. See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig.,  F.d ,  (th Cir. )
(holding that Supreme Court precedent regarding the precedential force of plurality opinions
requires focusing on Justice Breyer’s narrow concurrence in Nicastro).
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jurisdiction.101 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s reasoning in Nicastro is ripe for
reconsideration in light of his subsequent opinion in Wayfair.102
conclusion
Wayfair and Nicastro address similar scenarios. Both cases involved: ()
conduct by an entity outside the state (selling/manufacturing); that () had
consequences within the state (taxable event/physical injury); which ()
motivated the state to react by compelling the entity to take a particular action
(collect a tax/appear in court). Labelling Wayfair as a tax case and Nicastro as a
personal jurisdiction case impedes analysis rather than informing it.
Viewing state tax authority and personal jurisdiction as two related strands
of horizontal federalism jurisprudence reveals historical and conceptual
connections. These connections help illuminate the Supreme Court’s
inconsistent assumptions and preferences. In particular, Wayfair’s functional,
interest-oriented endorsement of state power is inconsistent with Nicastro’s rigid
xation on targeted contacts. The Court should invoke Wayfair to reconsider
Nicastro’s excessive limit on state authority.
More generally, the Court should be wary of its tendency to construct
doctrinal silos that obscure similarities between horizontal federalism problems.
The Constitution allocates power to and among states in myriad circumstances
using diverse methods. Comparing these contexts rather than addressing them
in isolation can provide a richer understanding of the constitutional values at
stake, the optimal frameworks for analyzing those values, and the factors that
courts should consider.
Allan Erbsen is a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks
to Diana Erbsen, Jill Hasday, Amy Monahan, Alan Morrison, and Mark Rosen for
helpful comments.
101.

See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court,  S. Ct.  () (citing Nicastro only in
the dissent); Walden v. Fiore,  S. Ct.  () (ignoring Nicastro). Two decisions
addressing “general jurisdiction” rather than “specic jurisdiction” also did not cite Nicastro.
BNSF Ry. v. Tyrell,  S. Ct.  (); Daimler AG v. Bauman,  S. Ct. ,  ()
(Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion citing only her dissent in Nicastro).
102. Prior to Wayfair, at least two amicus briefs and one commentator noted that Nicastro could be
read as supporting tighter limits on state tax jurisdiction. See Brief for Montana as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at -, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,  S. Ct. 
() (No. -); Brief of Amicus Curiae Online Merchants Guild in Support of
Respondents at -, Wayfair,  S. Ct.  () (No. -); Brannon P. Denning,
Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction: Implications for State Taxes,  ST. TAX NOTES , .
The fact that Wayfair expanded state authority highlights the importance of revisiting
elements of Nicastro that suggested a dierent trajectory.



